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JURISDICTION
Plaintiff/Appellees Scot and Brenda Roberts ("Roberts") do not contest the
jurisdiction of this Court, and submit that jurisdiction is proper in this Court for the reasons
set forth in the Appellant's Brief.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Defendant/Appellant A.J. Dean ("A.J. Dean") lists nine issues on appeal. For
puiposes of the discussion herein, these issues are addressed in the context of the following
three issues:
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in entering the default of A.J. Dean
based on a failure to comply with an order compelling discovery. This issue
incorporates issues A through D set forth in A.J. Dean's Brief (including both
issues labeled "C").

II.

Did the district court have an adequate factual basis upon which to base its
award of damages and punitive damages in the Default Judgment entered
against A.J. Dean. This issue incorporates issues E through G set forth in A.J.
Dean's Brief

III.

Was the district court required to vacate the Default Judgment because
Roberts' counsel had an unknown conflict of interest arising after the entry of
default. This issue corresponds with A.J. Dean's issue H.
GOVERNING LAW

Provisions of statutes and mles which are of central importance to this appeal are set
out verbatim in the portion of the argument to which they apply.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Procedural History.

This case arises out of the defective replacement of a driveway at the Roberts' home
in Salt Lake City, Utah. The Roberts' Complaint was filed on March 29, 1993, alleging
multiple claims against A.J. Dean arising from its misconduct in supplying materials to that
project, its recording and of a forged Notice of Lien, and its improper conduct in threatening
to enforce the Lien. A.J. Dean filed its Answer on April 29, 1993.
In March of 1994, the parties were before the district court on the Roberts' Motion
to Compel discoveiy. The district court ordered A.J. Dean to answer specific discovery
requests by April 5, 1994 and ordered that if A.J. Dean failed to respond to discoveiy, the
court would enter default on the ex parte motion of the Roberts. A.J. Dean failed to respond
to the discoveiy, and on April 18, 1994, the Roberts ultimately requested entry of default
pursuant to the Order.
After a hearing at which A.J. Dean was allowed to participate in full, the district court
granted the Roberts' Motion and directed Roberts' counsel to prepare findings. A.J. Dean
objected to the findings and the district court held another hearing, after which it executed
the findings, and entered default. A.J. Dean then filed a Motion to Set Aside, which the
district court denied after a hearing. The district court then set the matter for a hearing at
which to establish the amount of damages. The Roberts appeared and presented by sworn
proffer substantial evidence as to the factual basis of its claims and the basis for damages.
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The district court thus fixed damages, and entered its Default Judgment against A.J. Dean,
which was certified as final pursuant to Rule 54 (b). A J. Dean appealed the Judgment to this
Court.
B.

Facts Relevant to the Appeal.

For purposes of this appeal, the Roberts submit the following statement of relevant
facts.
1.

Facts Underlying the Roberts' Claims.

A.J. Dean provided materials in connection with installing the Roberts' driveway in
January of 1993. (R2386, at 99.) A.J. Dean provided cement in inappropriate weather
conditions, causing the diiveway to crack. (R2342-45.) A.J. Dean also drove its trucks over
the Roberts' lawn and into the house, causing substantial damage. (R2342-44.)
When the Roberts refused to pay a portion of the bill for the driveway, A.J. Dean
recorded a Notice of Lien. (R2342-46.) A.J. Dean's general manager, Robert Bagley, then
telephoned Brenda Roberts and threatened that her home would be sold immediately if she
did not pay in full. (R2386, at 99-102.) Thereafter, the Roberts engaged attorney Jaryl
Rencher to assist them and to prepare the Complaint in this action. (R2342, at 102.)
In the course of litigation, the Roberts discovered that the signature on the Notice of
Lien filed by A.J. Dean was in fact forged. (R2386, at 209.) Rencher thus requested, on
more than one occasion, that A.J. Dean release the forged lien, but A.J. Dean refused.
(R2342-45.) As a result of the lien, the Roberts were further damages in that they were
unable to obtain refinancing on their home. (R2342-48.)
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2.

The Order Compelling Discovery,

On August 18, 1993, Scot and Brenda Roberts ("Roberts") served their First Set of
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents on A.J. Dean. (R204.) Due to
a clerical error, some of the interrogatories made reference to claims for medical malpractice.
Counsel for A.J. Dean, Randall Marshall, brought this fact to Rencher's attention, and
Rencher instructed counsel to disregard inapplicable interrogatories or substitute appropriate
references to the propeity and case at issue. Rencher sent Marshall a letter to that effect on
November 22, 1994, and A. J. Dean made no further objection to the irrelevant interrogatories
until filing its Brief in this appeal.
On January 3, 1994, Roberts Served a Second Set of Interrogatories and Request for
Production of Documents on A.J. Dean, (R374.) A.J. Dean responded to that discovery in
part by asserting various objections. On January 19, 1994, Roberts filed a Motion to Compel
and for Sanctions based on A.J. Dean's failure to respond to the first set of discoveiy
requests and its objections to the second set. (R381.)
On March 21, 1994, the trial court heard argument on Roberts' Motion to Compel and
for Sanctions, and granted the Motion.1 (R560.) Specifically, the trial court ordered that A.J.
Dean provide answers to specific discoveiy requests by April 5, 1994. (R640.) The trial
court further ruled that if Dean did not comply by April 5,1994, Roberts could submit ex
parte an affidavit and motion to strike A.J. Dean's pleadings, and the trial court would enter
A. J. Dean's default. (R640, 641.) Both A J. Dean's counsel, Randall Marshall, and its
*A. J. Dean has not argued that the court erred in granting the Motion to Compel, and this
Court may thus consider that the Motion was properly granted based on A.J. Dean's failure to
comply with the applicable provisions of Part V of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
-4-

general manager, Robert Bagley, were present at the hearing and heard the ruling.
(Transcript of Proceedings at 2379, Appellant's Brief, Addendum B.)
The Roberts' prepared an Order reflecting the ruling, which it served on Randall
Marshall as counsel for A.J. Dean. The Order was delivered to the trial court for signature
on approximately March 31,1994. (R634.) At approximately the same time, Rencher
received from Julie Lund of the law firm of Green & Beny a Substitution of Counsel by
which Green & Beny purported to replace Randall Marshall as counsel. (R575.) While
Marshall did not sign the Substitution, he did file a notice of withdrawal of counsel on April
5, 1994. (R593.) Roberts responded to the Substitution with an objection to the withdrawal
of counsel on the basis that there were pending motions which had not been resolved.
(R591.)
On April 6, 1994, the trial court held a telephone conference to consider one of the
pending motions not related to the issues on appeal herein. (R1685, 1690). During the
course of that telephone hearing, the district court informed Randall Marshall that it would
not permit his withdrawal without leave of court, and that his request to withdraw was denied
at that time. (R1685, 1690). On April 11, 1994, Roberts filed a Memorandum in Opposition
to the request of A.J. Dean's counsel, Randall Marshall, to withdraw. (R652.)
On April 11, 1994, Scott Berry of Green & Berry filed an Appearance of Co-counsel,
reflecting delivery to all counsel of record on the case, including Randall Marshall. (R646.)
On April 12 and April 13, 1994, Roberts' counsel contacted Julie Lund at Green & Beny and
again requested that the answers to discovery be provided immediately. (R1689, Para. 12.)
Roberts counsel also faxed Ms. Lund a copy of the April 7, 1994 Order. (R1689, Para. 12.)
-5-

On April 18, 1994, after having not received A.J. Dean's responses to discoveiy,
Roberts filed a motion to strike A.J. Dean's pleadings and enter default. (R688.) On the
same day, A.J. Dean attempted to comply with the Order by filing responses to the
discoveiy, but those responses were deemed inadequate by the trial court. (R. 1567). This
Motion was heard on June 27, 1994, with Randall Marshall, Scott Berry and Julie Lund all
present on behalf of A.J. Dean. (R1212.) After hearing argument, the trial court ruled in
favor of Roberts, and instructed Rencher to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
("Findings"). (R1212.) Thereafter, A.J. Dean filed an objection to the proposed Findings,
and the district court set the matter for hearing. (R1268.) After taking the matter under
advisement (RMS 1), the trial court executed the Findings on December 5, 1994, and entered
a Default Judgment against Dean on the issue of liability, resemng only the issues of
damages for further hearing. (R1685.)
On January 19, 1995, A.J. Dean Filed a Rule 60(b) Motion to Set aside Entry of
Default. (R1722.) At approximately the same time, it was discovered that Rencher's law
firm had commenced representing A.J. Dean as counsel for A.J. Dean's insurance carrier in
defense litigation in approximately July of 1994. (See record entries at R1891, R1899,
Transcript Proceedings August 13, 1996, R2386, p. 140). As a result, Roberts' counsel, Jaryl
Rencher, voluntarily withdrew on March 24, 1995. (R1923.) Woodbury & Kesler then
entered its appearance as Roberts' counsel and filed Roberts Memorandum opposing the
Motion to Set Aside on October 5, 1995. (R1936.) After a hearing, A.J. Dean's Motion to
Set Aside Default was denied. (Transcript of Proceedings January 12, 1996, R283; Order
R1969).
-6-

The court then set a hearing to review the prima facie claims of the Roberts, to fix
damages, and to consider the Roberts' request for punitive damages. (R2386.) Roberts
presented prima facie evidence of their claims through a proffer of counsel, which was
affirmed under oath by the Roberts, who were present. Roberts also put on testimony of an
expert witness, Brent Thomas, as to damages, and the testimony of Scot Roberts, Brenda
Roberts, and Jaryl Rencher relative to punitive damages. A.J. Dean conducted crossexamination of all witnesses as to the issue of damages. (See generally. R2386 (transcript)).
Default judgment was entered in favor of Roberts against A.J. Dean on December 20, 1996.
The trial court fixed damages in the amount of $28,978.01, and punitive damages in the
amount of $5,000.00. (R2351.) A.J. Dean's Notice of Appeal was filed January 6, 1997.
(R2353.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Roberts argues herein that the Default Judgment was appropriate in all respects, and
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding damages and punitive damages
thereon. First, the Roberts argue that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing
the sanction of default on A.J. Dean for failure to comply with a valid order compelling
discoveiy. The excuses offered by A.J. Dean in an attempt to justify its failure to comply
are without merit because A.J. Dean had appropriate notice of the Order compelling
discoveiy, and willfully failed to comply.
Second, the Roberts argue that the trial court acted appropriately in conducting a
hearing pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 55 (b)(2) to fix the amount of damages. The trial court
heard proffers regarding liability on the Roberts theories of relief, and heard live testimony
-7-

of witnesses as to damages and punitive damages, subject to the cross-examination of A.J.
Dean. The trial court's award of damages was thus supported by substantial credible
evidence, and should not be disturbed on appeal.
Finally, the Roberts argue that the conflict of interest which required the withdrawal
of thel'r prior counsel, Jaryl Rencher, did not taint the judgment in any material way and is
not pioper grounds upon which to vacate the judgment of the trial court.
ARGUMENT
I.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
ENTERING THE DEFAULT OF A.J. DEAN BASED ON A
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH AN ORDER COMPELLING
DISCOVERY?

A.

Discovery Sanctions are Reviewed for Abuse of Discretion,

At the heart of its appeal, A.J. Dean requests this Court to reverse a sanction imposed
under Utah R. Civ. P. 37 (b) for failure to comply with an order compelling discovery.
Under Utah law, however, the imposition of sanctions under Rule 37 is committed to the
discretion of the trial court. The Utah Supreme Court described the standard of review in
Morton v. Continental Baking Co.. 938 P.2d 271 (Utah 1997), as follows:
Even though dismissal of a non-complying party's action is one of the
"most severe of the potential sanctions that can be imposed," it is clear
from the language of rule 37 that it is within a trial court's discretion
to impose such a sanction. "Because trial courts must deal first hand
with the parties and the discovery process, they are given broad
discretion regarding the imposition of discoveiy sanctions." Thus we
have long held that we will not interfere unless "abuse of that discretion
[is] clearly shown."
* * *

We will find that a trial court has abused its discretion in choosing
-8-

which sanction to impose only if there is either "an erroneous
conclusion of law or . . . no evidentiaiy basis for the trial court's
ruling."
Id. at 274 (citations omitted). See also Utah Dept. of Transportation v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d
4 (Utah 1995) (Supreme Court will not interfere with the trial court's exercise of discretion
unless abuse of that discretion is clearly shown.); Katz v. Pierce. 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986)
(That some basis may exist to set aside the default does not require the conclusion that the
court abused its discretion in refusing to do so when facts and circumstances support the
refusal.)
In short, the law imposes on A.J. Dean in this appeal a burden of demonstrating a
clear abuse of discretion.

To succeed, A J. Dean must demonstrate that there is no

evidentiary basis in the record for the tidal courts findings. A.J. Dean has made no effort to
marshal the evidence and demonstrate the absence of such a basis, and the appeal therefore
must fail.
B.

The Default Judgment was not an Abuse of Discretion.

Rule 37(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit
discoveiy .. . the court in which the action is pending may make such
orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others the
following:
# ##

(C) an order striking out pleadings . . . or rendering a
judgment by default against the disobedient party.
The Utah Supreme Court has recently considered the sanction of default for failure to comply
with an order compelling discoveiy in Morton v. Continental Baking Co.. 938 P.2d 271
-9-

(Utah 1997). In that case, Morton obtained a continuance of trial to allow him to present a
new theory at trial. ML at 275. He then failed to respond to discovery requests addressed to
that new theoiy. Id Morton admitted that he received the Defendant's Motion to Compel,
which specifically requested the sanction of dismissal if he did not comply with discoveiy.
Neveitlieless, Morton's counsel did not respond, and the court ultimately dismissed Morton's
Complaint. Id The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the sanction of dismissal should
only be applied in the cases involving more egregious neglect and misconduct. TdL at 273-74.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial
court's imposition of the sanction of dismissal. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that in
order to impose sanctions under Rule 37 (b), the trial court need only find that the noncomplying party's conduct amounted to "willfulness, bad faith, or fault," or "persistent
dilatory tactics frustrating the judicial process." Id at 274, 276. The Supreme Court defined
this standard of conduct as follows:
To find that a party's behavior has been willful, there need only
be '"any intentional failure as distinguished from involuntary
noncompliance.'" Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., (quoting, M.E.N. Co. v.
Control Fluidics. Inc.. 834 F.2d 869, 872-73 (10th Cir. 1987)).
938 P.2d at 276. The Supreme Court concluded that because Morton was aware of the
Motion to Compel and still failed to respond to the discoveiy, his conduct was "at least
willful." Id at 276. Citing instances in which the sanction of dismissal or default judgment
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was affirmed from relatively non-egregious conduct,2 the Supreme Court ruled that the trial
court was within its discretion in imposing the sanction of dismissal. JdL at 276-77. See also
U.D.O.T. v. Osguthorpe. 892 P.2d 4 (1995) (holding that the sanction of default judgment
is appropriate upon a showing of willfulness or fault, and that no wrongful intent need be
shown).
In this case, A.J. Dean's general manager and counsel were both present in the
courtroom when the trial judge ordered that A.J. Dean comply with discovery or suffer the
sanction of default judgment, without further opportunity to be heard.

Rather than

responding to the discoveiy, however, A.J. Dean apparently fried to fire its counsel, Randall
Marshall. At tlie time both Marshall and A.J. Dean knew that die court had reached the limit

2

The Supreme Court's discussion in Morton of the prior cases casts substantial light on the
facts at issue in this appeal, and is therefore worth quoting at length:
[W]e have affirmed a trial court's dismissal as a sanction for behavior
clearly less egregious than that apparently required by the court of appeals.
See, e.g., W.W. & W.B. Gardner, 568 P.2d at 736-38 (affirming default
judgment entered against defendant because defendant's answer to
plaintiffs interrogatories and requests for production of documents were
late, even though they were filed before hearing on summary judgment
motion); Tucker Realty, 396 P.2d at 412, 16 Utah 2d at 99-101 (affirming
default judgment where plaintiff responded to court order to compel
production of documents by only producing one of many required
documents); accord Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584,
586-87 (Utah. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming default judgment where plaintiffs
failed to timely respond to interrogatories after court granted several
continuances on plaintiffs' behalf, and plaintiffs had been "somewhat
uneven in discharging their burden of prosecuting the case in a timely
fashion"). In any event, all of these cases clearly stand for the proposition
that trial courts are granted a great deal of deference in dismissing a case as
a discovery sanction.
938P.2dat276.
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of its patience and that if A.J. Dean did not respond, default judgment would be entered
immediately. The failure to respond to discovery was clearly willful within the meaning
clarified by the Supreme Court in Morton. As such, the trial court had broad discretion to
impose the sanction of dismissal, and its decision to do so should not be reversed.3
C.

A,J. Dean's Excuses for Failure to Comply with the Order
Compelling Discovery are without Merit.

On at least three occasions,4 A.J. Dean presented to the trial court several excuses for
its failure to comply with the Order compelling discovery. Five of those excuses are offered
for consideration on appeal. (See Brief of A.J. Dean, Issues A through D).
1.

Service of Defective Tnterrogatories.

The fact that A.J. Dean's first set of discovery requests included references to claims
for medical malpractice was never an issue in the trial court and is a red herring in this
appeal. That issue was fully resolved by counsel's letter of November 22, 1993, and was
never again brought to issue in the trial court. To the extent that any "confusion" did arise
from the interrogatories, that conilision was unmistakably resolved on March 21, 1994, when
the trial court ordered A.J. Dean to answer specific interrogatories and requests.

3

The fact that the Order compelling discovery in this case clearly identified "default" as the
sanction that would be imposed if A.J. Dean did not comply with the Order provided fair warning
to A.J. Dean of the seriousness of the situation, and was surely intended to motivate A.J. Dean to
comply. The Roberts submit that if the trial court's discretion to actually impose the remedy of
default is restrained in these circumstances, trial courts would lose the ability to control the
conduct of recalcitrant litigants in this manner. That result would clearly be contrary to the intent
expressed in Utah R. Civ. P. 37.
4

The three occasions wt e the hearing on the Roberts' Motion for entry of default, the
hearing on A.J. Dean's objections to the proposed Findings, and the hearing on A.J. Dean's
Motion to set aside the default.
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In its Brief, A J. Dean attempts to direct the inquiry back to the Order compelling
discovery, arguing that the trial court did not consider the "confusion" caused by the medical
malpractice interrogatories in issuing the Order to Compel. A.J. Dean's assertion, however,
finds no basis in the record, particularly in light of the fact that the Order was made over A.J.
Dean's objection and Motion for Protective Order, which was based primarily on the alleged
"confusion." The Roberts submit that A.J. Dean cannot excuse its own failure to comply
with the Order by reviving the same unsuccessful argument it advanced in attempting to
resist entry of the Order. A.J. Dean offers no reason to conclude that the Order was an abuse
of discretion. Therefore, the inquiry in this appeal should be limited to A.J. Dean's excuses
for not complying with the Order, rather than the substance of the Order itself.5
2.

Service of Order,

A.J. Dean's second excuse is that Roberts failed to serve the Order implementing the
Court's ruling on the Motion to Compel on Green & Beny. In short, A.J. Dean argues that
because of the Substitution of Counsel filed March 29, 1994, the proposed Order should have
been served on Green & Beny.

5

Without citing authority, A.J. Dean's brief puts forth the novel theory that an
Order to Compel under Utah R. Civ. P. 37 should be subject to the same 30 day time
period set forth in Rule 33 (a). While it is true that a party has 30 days to answer
interrogatories in the first instance, once a party has missed this deadline it is no longer
entitled to this amount of time. In Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950, 955
(Utah App. 1989), the Appeals Court upheld the trial court's entry of default on the
grounds that no justifiable excuse was offered for failure to comply with the court's
discoveiy order which allowed only two weeks—the same time period as that allowed in
the case now at issue.
-13-

That argument was rejected in the trial court for three reasons, each of which is
equally persuasive here. First, regardless of the Order, A. J. Dean had actual notice of the
Court's ruling on the Motion to Compel and was obligated to comply. Robert Bagley, A.J.
Dean's general manager, was in fact present in the courtroom when the ruling was
announced. Even assuming that A.J. Dean's decision to change counsel right at this critical
time period was properly motivated, it was A. J. Dean's responsibility to apprize its new
counsel of the pending deadline, of which it was keenly aware.
Second, service on Randall Marshall was proper. Immediately upon receipt of the
Substitution of Counsel, Roberts objected to Marshall's withdrawal as counsel. Moreover,
the trial court informed Mr. Marshall that it would not approve his withdrawal at that time
because there were motions pending. At that point, Marshall had a duty to continue
representing his client, and service on Marshall was deemed service on A.J. Dean under Utah
R. Civ. P. 5.
Finally, Green & Berry had notice of the deadline by at least April 11, 1994, and
failed to take any action until April 18, 1994. It is important to note that Roberts did not
dash into court ex parte, as authorized by the Order, and obtain a judgment on the first day
after the deadline. Instead, Roberts waited a full week, discussed the Order with Julie Lund,
waited almost another full week, and finally made a motion for entry of judgment. By that
point, A.J. Dean and its various lawyers had received substantially more notice than that to
which they were entitled under the Order. Simply put, the fact that the Order was not
delivered to Green & Berry does not change the fact that A.J. Dean's failure to comply with
the Order was willful and the result of fault attributable directly to the party and its counsel.
-14-

In summary, the trial court's Findings provided that A.J. Dean had been dilatory in
responding to discovery, that A.J. Dean had adequate notice of the April 5, 1994 deadline
for answering discoveiy, that A.J. Dean failed to comply with the April 5, 1994 deadline, and
that A.J. Dean's "proposed answers" to discoveiy delivered April 18, 1994 were not
adequate. (R1685-1721.) Nothing in A.J. Dean's discussion of the adequacy of notice
provides any basis for challenging those Findings.
3.

Rule 4-506 and Substitution of Counsel.

In the trial court, A.J. Dean argued that Green & Berry should have been substituted
as counsel effective March 30, 1994, and thus should have been served with the Order. With
regard to that argument, the trial court found as follows:
14[ Nowhere in this Court's rules were Roberts required to
serve pleadings upon attorneys that had attempted a substitution of
counsel without the order of this Court required by Rule 4-506(1) of
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Further, if one of A.J.
Dean's attorneys thought that another should be further involved in
communications with the Court, that attorney had eveiy opportunity to
raise this point and chose not to do so. Nowhere in any of the
documents on file with this Court has A.J. Dean's attorney, Mr.
Marshall, claimed by sworn affidavit or otherwise that (1) he did not
receive, as A.J. Dean's counsel, all material matters that were filed in
this case, (2) he did not appear on March 21, 1994, as counsel for A.J.
Dean when the Court ordered A.J. Dean to comply with discoveiy
responsibilities by April 5, 1994, and (3) he did not participate in the
telephone conversation with the Court on April 6, 1994. To the
contrary, the record reflects the fact that A.J. Dean appeared through
counsel and was properly served with all filings in this case.
(R1685, 1695.)
In a further development of the same argument, A.J. Dean now argues that Rule 4-506
has been amended effective November 1, 1997 to provide that no court approval is required
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for a Substitution of Counsel if no requests for extension of time are made. Although A.J.
Dean cites some cases appearing to favor the retroactive application of procedural
amendments, this argument ultimate fails for three reasons.
First, the argument fails to acknowledge that the issue is not whether Mr. Berry or Mr.
Marshall was really the lawyer in charge, but whether A.J. Dean had proper notice of the
Order. Since A.J. Dean's lawyer and its general manager both heard the trial court's ruling
establishing the April 5, 1994 deadline, there can be no dispute that notice was adequate.
Second, the text of the Rule itself provides that the amendment is "effective
November 1, 1997." Because the rale itself expressly provides for an effective date, it
cannot be said that the amendment should have been effective three and a half years earlier
when Randall Marshall was trying to withdraw as counsel.
And third, even under the cases cited by A.J. Dean, the newly amended Rule 4-506
would not be retroactively applied in this case after final judgment. In Pilcher v. State Dept
of Social Services. 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983), the Supreme Court held that procedural
statutes enacted subsequent to the initiation of a suit which do not enlarge, eliminate, or
destroy vested or contractual rights apply not only to future actions, but also to accrued and
pending actions as well, hi this case, A.J. Dean attempts to apply the rule not in an accrued
and pending case, but in a case that is finished and over, final judgment having been entered.
Nothing in Pilcher or the cases cited in A.J. Dean's Brief supports the proposition that when
procedural rales are amended, courts must roll back each case on their docket to the
beginning and start over under the new rales.
Moreover, retroactive application of the new rule in this case would be forbidden
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under the mle set forth in Pilcher. because the Roberts' judgment constitutes a vested right
as a matter of law. Black's Law Dictionaiy defines "vested rights" as follows:
In constitutional law, rights which have so completely and
definitely accrued to or settled in a person that they are not subject to
be defeated or canceled by the act of any other private person, and
which it is right and equitable that the government should recognize
and protect, as being lawful in themselves, and settled according to the
then current rules of law, and of which the individual could not be
deprived arbitrarily without injustice, or of which he could not justly
be deprived otherwise than by the established methods of procedure
and for the public welfare. Such interests as cannot be interfered with
by retrospective laws; interests which it is proper for state to recognize
and protect and of which individual cannot be deprived arbitrarily
without injustice.
Blacks Law Dictionaiy 1402 (6th Ed. 1979). Both Pilcher and the cases cited by A.J. Dean
support the proposition that no enactment can be applied retroactively to affect ones vested
rights. Certainly, Utah law does not provide that every time there is an amendment to the
rules of procedure, persons holding final judgments are required to re-litigate all affected
procedural issues in the case.
In summary, regardless of how Rule 4-506 has been amended since the time of
Randall Marshall's abortive withdrawal, the fact remains that A.J. Dean received proper
notice that if it did not respond to discoveiy before April 5, 1994, it would be defaulted and
judgment would be entered. Final judgment having now been entered, the vested rights of
the parties are not changed by an amended Rule 4-506 with an effective date of November
1, 1997.
4.

Timing of the Order,

In its Brief, A.J. Dean suggests that the Order was improper because it was not
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entered until after the April 5, 1994 deadline had already passed. The trial court provided
an appropriate response to that argument in its Order denying A.J. Dean's motions for
additional time to complete discovery and for relief from the April 7, 1994 Order:
With regard to the comment that the Court's order was signed
April 7 inchoating an April 5 deadline, the parties were fully aware of
when the deadline was. The order was presented to the Court and the
Court waited five days plus three days mailing before entering that
order to make sure there was no objection to that order. No objection
was made.
(R1424, 1427.)
A.J. Dean's Brief offers no legal or factual reason why the Court's entry of the Order
on April 7, 1994 would nullify the Order in total. Roberts submits that the Order was
properly executed pursuant to Rule 4-504, and was immediately effective upon entry.
5.

The Roberts 5 Delay in Obtaining New Counsel,

A.J. Dean's Brief did not provide a substantive discussion of its issue D set forth in
the Statement of Issues. The Roberts assume that this issue has been abandoned for purposes
of this appeal, and do not discuss the issue herein.
In summary, the trial court ordered A.J. Dean to respond to discoveiy, and clearly
informed A.J. Dean that failure to do so would result in the entry of default. When A.J.
Dean knowingly and willfully failed to comply, the trial court was within its discretion in
ordering that default be entered. A.J. Dean's excuses for its failure to comply are without
merit and do not in any way justify A.J. Dean's failure to comply with a clearly stated order
of the trial court.
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II.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT HAVE AN ADEQUATE
FACTUAL BASIS UPON WHICH TO BASE ITS AWARD OF
DAMAGES AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST A.J. DEAN.

Upon entry of judgment as to liability, the Court set the matter for a hearing on the
issue of damages. The Court ordered that although A.J. Dean was in default and technically
not entitled to participate at all, it would allow A.J. Dean to be present and participate in
some respects.
At the Court's invitation, Roberts established prima facie evidence of six of its claims
for relief against A.J. Dean by a proffer of evidence which was affirmed by the Roberts who
were present in the courtroom. The Roberts further established that they were entitled to
damages in liquidated amounts on each of their claims. The Roberts did not make any claim
for general damages, and no such damages were awarded. The Roberts did request punitive
damages, and after taking the matter under advisement, a Judgment was entered awarding
the liquidated damages in the total amount of $28,978.01 as established at the hearing, plus
punitive damages in the amount of $5,000.00. The Roberts submit that A.J. Dean's
challenges to both awards are without merit.
A,

The Award of Damages was Justified by Competent Evidence.

Utah R. Civ. P. 55 (b)(2) describes the method of ascertaining damages where a party
is in default as follows:
In all other cases, the party entitled to a judgment by default
shall apply to the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court to enter
judgment or to cany it into effect, it is necessaiy to take an account or
to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any
averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter,
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the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it
deems necessaiy and proper.
Under this rule, it is incumbent upon the non-defaulting party to establish by competent
evidence the amount of recoverable damages. Arnica Mut. Tns. Co. v. Schettler. 798 P.2d
950 (Utah App. 1989).
A.J. Dean's Brief argues that proffered evidence is insufficient, and cites Larsen v.
Colina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984), for the proposition that defendants have a right to be
present at such a heaiing. A.J. Dean thus argues that the Court ened by allowing evidence
to be presented by sworn proffer, and by precluding it from conducting cross-examination.
The Roberts submit that A.J. Dean's argument fails for three reasons. First, the Court
did conduct a hearing and all damages were established by testimony subject to crossexamination. Not only did the Roberts present sworn proffers, but they also took the stand
and answered questions on A.J. Dean's cross-examination. The Roberts also called Brent
Thomas, a structural engineer, who testified as to damages. A.J. Dean had a full opportunity
to cross-examine Mr. Thomas on the issue of damages. In fact, the only limitation placed
on A.J. Dean's cross-examination of all witnesses was the trial court's directive that crossexamination be limited to the issue of damages, and not address liability. In short, A.J. Dean
did have a full and fair opportunity to cross examine all witnesses on the issue of liability.
Second, both the Rule and the case cited by A.J. Dean allow the court substantial
discretion. The rule requires only such proceedings as the court deems "necessaiy and
proper," while Larsen provides that the court may conduct a hearing, and is silent regarding
the degree to which a defaulting party would be allowed to participate. Thus, the only real
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question on appeal is whether the amount of damages is supported by "competent evidence."
In this case, A.J. Dean has offered no substantive challenge to the evidence upon which the
damage calculations were based.
And third, under Rule 55 (b)(2) it is clear that no hearing is necessary if the items of
damages are all "sums certain." See Russell v. MartelL 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984). In
Dundee Cement Co. v. Howard Pipe & Concrete Products. Inc.. 722 F.2d 1319 (7th Cir.
1983), the court explained that a hearing on damages for a judgment by default is not
required when "the amount claimed is liquidated or capable of ascertainment from definite
figures contained in the documentaiy evidence or detailed affidavits." Under this standard,
the sums certain established at the damages hearing by sworn proffer were sufficient to
establish the amounts in question.6
In this case, each element of damages claimed was for a sum certain and was
established by competent evidence. The Coiut awarded $7,960.00 for repair of the driveway
based on documentaiy evidence of bid to complete such work. The Court awarded $170.00
and $490.00 as the actual cost of repairing the rain gutters and landscaping respectively. The
Court awarded $10,900.00 as the statutory penalty for wrongful lien, which calculation A J.
Dean has not disputed. And the Court awarded $9,458.00 for lost oppoitunity in refinancing
the Roberts' mortgage, which amount was fixed by testimony at the time default was
originally entered. Thus, every amount of damages included in the Judgment was a sum
Significantly, while A.J. Dean assails the manner in which the hearing was held, it offers
no argument supported by citation to the record calling into question the amounts of damages
fixed by the Court. The Roberts submit that it is incumbent on A.J. Dean to demonstrate the
insufficiency of the evidence as to any point of damages he wishes to challenge. A.J. Dean's
Brief makes no effort to make such a showing.
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certain based on competent evidence including documents, testimony, and the sworn proffer
of counsel The Court clearly fulfilled the mandate of Rule 55 (b)(2) by conducting hearings
which, to borrow the language of the rule, were "necessary and proper" under the
circumstances.
B.

The Award of Punitive Damages was Appropriate,

A. J. Dean's Brief suggests that the $5,000.00 punitive damage award in this case was
not warranted because A J. Dean was not allowed to participate in the hearing. In fact, A.J.
Dean was able to paiticipate in the healing to a degree beyond that necessaiy to satisfy Rule
55 (b)(2). Specifically, the trial court allowed A.J. Dean a full opportunity to cross examine
witnesses Scot Roberts, Brenda Roberts, and Jaryl Rencher as to all issues relative to
punitive damages. (See R2386, at 97-183). The trial court also heard extensive argument
of counsel relative to the issue. (R.2386, at 211-25). In short, the trial court went beyond
the requirements of Rule 55 (b)(2) in establishing that punitive damages were warranted
based on clear and convincing evidence.
A.J. Dean also argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the award. In
fact, the trial court did in fact make sufficient findings to support the award of punitive
damages. Under Utah law, punitive damages are warranted where conduct is willful and
malicious or manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, the
rights of others. Arnica Mut. Ins. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950 (Utah 1989). In its ruling, the
trial court described the conduct of A.J. Dean as follows:
In entering its order regarding default and A.J. Dean's motions, this Court
determined among other things that there had been a willful pattern of delay
in A.J. Dean's actions and a willful failure on the part of A.J. Dean to comply
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with discovery orders and respond to discovery requests. Further, the Court
stated that A.J. Dean had not conducted itself appropriately and that there had
been a dramatic lack of cooperation on the part of A.J. Dean, prejudicing
Roberts.
(R1570, 1573.)7
In general, tiial courts are granted a broad measure of discretion in weighing the
appropriate factors and deteimining an appropriate award of punitive damages, and the tiial
court's decision will not be disturbed in its conclusions absent an abuse of discretion. Amica

7

The Court's conclusion is further supported by the following findings made in the Court's
bench ruling at the hearing on damages:
Because of the recalcitrance of A.J. Dean, which is plainly
demonstrated, even by their own pleadings in the case, there has been a
consistent and clear course of conduct by A.J. Dean since the beginning,
well since they, at first made efforts to attempt to collect its bill in the
unlawful manner in which it did, misconduct, willful and malicious behavior
o the part of A.J. Dean, bad faith, deception and A.J. Dean now makes the
argument that the first call to Mrs. Roberts was one to two minutes and all
they wanted—all they said was that she would—have that she and her
husband would have to pay the bill or else the house would be sold in three
days.
That is an astonishing statement to make. I have yet to hear any
case in which I have ever been involved as a judge or an attorney, of a
collector making a call like that and threatening a home owner out of the
blue with such a claim. It is highly offensive, it is highly inappropriate and
with no other evidence about A.J. Dean's conduct, in my opinion,
constitutes conduct that warrants punitive damages.
But there is more, even after the conversation with Mr. Rencher
and Mr. Rencher indicated that there was no valid claim for the lien
against the Roberts, A.J. Dean went out and yet again misconducted itself
in a way that was clearly willful, malicious and in bad faith.
Inferentially, that also adds to the previous conduct that this is a—
clearly suggestive of a cjurse of business conduct by A.J. Dean and how it
collects its bills from its customers.
And I don't think there is any question whatsoever about the
punitive, about the inappropriate, malicious, willful conduct about A.J.
Dean.
(R2384, at 9-10)
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Mut. Tns. Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950, 967 (Utah App. 1989). In this case, it is clear that
the trial court was well within its discretion in awarding punitive damages based upon the
willful and malicious conduct of A.J. Dean.
III.

WAS THE DISTRICT COURT REQUIRED TO VACATE
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT BECAUSE ROBERTS'
COUNSEL HAD AN UNKNOWN CONFLICT OF INTEREST
ARISING AFTER THE ENTRY OF DEFAULT.

A.J. Dean accurately cites Rule 1.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for the
proposition that a lawyer may not represent a client if the representation is directly adverse
to another client, unless both clients consent after consultation. In fact, there is no doubt in
this case that when Mr. Rencher's firm began representing A.J. Dean's as counsel for its
insurer, Rencher was required to obtain consent or withdraw.
From that premise, A.J. Dean makes the argument that the Default Judgment should
be vacated because it was tainted by the conflict of interest. By A.J. Dean's own admission,
that argument has never been accepted by any Utah court, and the Roberts urge this Court
to reject it here. First, Rencher acted appropriately in all respects in this case. The parties
do not dispute that as soon as the conflict was discovered, Rencher took appropriate action
to withdraw. Withdrawal, of course, is the remedy prescribed by the Rules of Professional
Conduct when conflicts arise. A.J. Dean fails to explain why Rencher's withdrawal was not
fully sufficient to vindicate the policies of the Rules of Professional Conduct as described
in Margulies v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195, 1204 (Utah 1985).
Second, no prejudice arose from the representation. In Parkinson v. Phonex Corp..
857 F.Supp. 1474 (D.Utah 1994), the court emphasize the absence of prejudice as a factor
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to consider in application of the Rules of Professional Conduct. There, one attorney
represented a plaintiff in litigation while his partner represented a named defendant on other
matters. On the defendant's motion to disqualify plaintiffs counsel, the court held that
because the partner had withdrawn as soon as he became aware of the conflict, and because
there was no evidence of information exchanged between the partners relative to the
representation, the plaintiffs attorney was not disqualified from continuing.8
In this case, A.J. Dean fails to explain any way in which Rencher gained an advantage
in representing the Roberts based on his firm's representation of A.J. Dean's insurer. In fact,
where Rencher was not even aware of the conflict until immediately prior to his withdrawal,
it is safe to assume that the conflict provided Rencher with no benefit at all. Because A.J.
Dean has suffered no prejudice from the conflicting representation and because Rencher
withdrew as soon as the conflict became known, A.J. Dean's request for relief is without
basis.
Finally, A.J. Dean failed to preserve this issue in the trial court. Although the court
was aware that a conflict had arisen and that Mr. Rencher was required to withdraw, A.J.
Dean made no motion to vacate the entry of default or to obtain any other relief on that basis.
In fact, the first time A J. Dean suggested that the Judgment was somehow tainted by the Mr.
Rencher's conflict of interest was in the Brief recently filed with this Court. The Roberts
submit that if the issue would have been raised below, and if the trial court would have
perceived some prejudice arising from the conflicting representation, the trial court could

8

The Roberts note that disqualification of counsel and not setting aside offinaljudgment is
the appropriate issue in cases arising under Rule 1.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
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have taken appropriate steps to remedy the prejudice. A.J. Dean's failure to make any such
request below prevents it from raising the issue for the first time on appeal.
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, the Roberts urge this Court to affirm the
Judgment of the Trial Court in every respect. The Roberts further request an award of their
attorney fees incuired in defending this appeal on the basis that they were adjudicated to be
entitled to an award of fees in the trial court, and are therefore entitled to fees on appeal.
DATED this _$_ day of March, 1998.
WOODBURY & KESLER, V.C.

Reid W. Lambert
Michelle A. Ontiveros
Attorney for Appellees
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EXHIBIT "A"

:

Jaryl L. Rencher #4903
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
Post Office Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
(801)

ii.^0 ih CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

m 7m

363-7611

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT f N~^AND^ BOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SCOT and BRENDA ROBERTS,
Plaintiffs,

"2-C^CM

MILTON MUIR CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY; A.J. DEAN CEMENT
COMPANY or in the alternative
A.J. DEAN & SONS, INC.; MILTON
MUIR; KATHERYNE MUIR, aka GALE
MUIR; and JOHN R. MOYLE, aka
MOYLE LANDSCAPING COMPANY,

ORDER REGARDING SANCTIONS
AND COMPELLING A.J. DEAN'S
RESPONSE TO DISCOVERY

Defendants.
MILTON MUIR dba MILTON MUIR
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 930901740CV
Judge Anne M. Stirba

SHEILA ROBERTS,
Third-Party Defendant
and Third-Party
Crossclaimant.
The above-entitled matter came before the Court pursuant to
Rule

4-501

of

the

Utah

Code

of

Judicial

Administration.

Specifically, plaintiffs, Scot and Brenda Roberts, and third-party

0 0 0 0 39

defendant

and

counterelaimant,

Sheila

Roberts

(hereinafter,

collectively, "Roberts"), have filed a motion to compel and for
sanctions to compel discovery from A.J. Dean & Sons, Inc.
The Court, having considered Roberts' motion and A.J. Dean &
Sons, Inc.'s opposition thereto, and having held a hearing on the
saiu 3 on March 21, 1994, and considering the argument raised by
counsel for the parties and otherwise being fully advised as to the
law and the facts and the record in this case and for good cause
shown,

now

hereby

grants

Roberts' motion

to

compel

and

for

sanctions and orders A.J. Dean & Sons, Inc. to answer Interrogatory
Nos.

23 and 26 from Roberts' first set of interrogatories and

requests for production of documents, Nos. 2 and 4 from Roberts'
first set of requests for production of documents, and to answer
all of Roberts' second set of discovery requests to A.J. Dean &
Sons, Inc.

A.J. Dean & Sons, Inc. are ordered to answer this

discovery by April 5, 1994.

In the event that A.J. Dean & Sons,

Inc. does not comply with this order, Roberts may, ex parte, submit
an

affidavit

and

motion

to

strike

A.J.

Dean

&

Sons,

Inc.'s

pleadings and for entry of default against them.
The Court also hereby finds that Roberts' request for attorney
fees and costs is appropriate and grants the same.
The Court, having considered the affidavit of Roberts' counsel
and finding the charges in it both reasonable and necessary, hereby
orders defendant A.J. Dean to pay Roberts $501.50 in costs and
attorney fees.
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The Court, also considering the affidavit of fees and costs
related to Roberts7 motion to compel from defendants Muir and the
Court

having

already

granted

Roberts' motion

against

those

defendants and finding the costs and attorney fees reasonable and
necessary, hereby orders defendants Muir to pay Roberts $369.00 in
costs and attorney fees.
DATED this

sf&~--day of

VJs^fVA3(

1994.

BY^ THE COURT

Gu^

Honorable Anne M. S
District Court Judoe

0 00641

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document was mailed, postage prepaid, this

3o~

day of

, 1994, to:
Attorney for Defendants Muir
Rancty B . B i r c h
BERTCH & BIRCH
2964 West 4700 South #210
Salt Lake City, UT 84118
Attorney for Defendant A.J. Dean & Sons
Randall L. Marshall
311 South State, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2379
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
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FILED IN ™ •""K'S OFFICE

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STAT¥ ^ e f l 5 S f i l t y

2
3
4

*

7
8

9
10

*

SCOT and BRENDA ROBERTS,

By
Deputy Cler,

5
6

*

Plaintiffs,

Case No.

930901740

MILTON MUIR CONSTRUCTION CO.;
A.J. DEAN CEMENT COMPANY or in
the alternative A.J. DEAN &
SONS, INC.; MILTON MUIR;
KATHERYNE MUIR, aka GALE MUIR;
and JOHN R. MOYLE, aka MOYLE
LANDSCAPING COMPANY,

PROCEEDINGS on
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT and
other MOTIONS

Defendants.

12

MILTON MUIR dba MILTON MUIR
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,

14
15
16

Third-Party Plaintiff,
v.
SHEILA ROBERTS,

17

Third-Party Defendant
and Third-Party
Crossclaimant.

18
19

*

*

*

20

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA
21

Salt Lake City, Utah
Monday, June 27, 1994

22
23
24
25

REPORTER;

CV

Transcript of:

v.

11

13

Utah

SUZANNE WARNICK, CSR, RPR-CM
Official Court Reporter
240 East 400 South, #304
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: 801-535-5470
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1
2

days, as counsel pointed out, to act upon your Honor's order.
And I think most importantly your Honor's order

3

allowed me to come into chambers and seek it ex parte and

4

proffer damages. And I didn't do that.

5

counsel because, as I did with our motion against Mr. Muir, I

6

didn't want there to be any question —

7

Honor's suggestion that ex parte was appropriate —

8

want there to be any question that I was trying to notify all

9

counsel of my concerns.

10
11
12

I notified all of

notwithstanding your
I didn't

I'll submit on that, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.

Thank you, counsel.

It appears to the Court there has been activity on

13

the part of A.J. Dean after the appearance of Mr. Berry and

14

Ms. Lund into the case. As I said, I don't think there is

15

any problem at all with notice here.

16

been any lack of courtesy shown here.

17

Notice was given.

I don't think there has

Counsel for A.J. Dean was

18

present on March 21st.

19

mistaken about this and it's not a major point, but I believe

20

I even asked whether that would be enough time of

21

Mr. Marshall at that hearing, whether April 5th would be

22

enough time to respond, and because I didn't want there to be

23

another problem like this.

24
25

It's my recollection, I may be

The arguments Mr. Berry has advanced would be very
compelling to the Court if this were not the second time we

^z

1

were dealing with these kinds of problems in formal motions.

2

The answers were not timely filed, contrary to the Court's

3

order.

4

answers hadn't been given timely in accordance with the Rules

5

of Civil Procedure.

6

There has been a pattern on the part of A.J. Dean of not

7

being fully responsive.

8

not timely filed.

That followed recognition by the Court that the

9

There has been a pattern of delay.

The Motion for Extension of Time was

With regard to the comment that the Court's order

10

was signed April 7 indicating an April 5 deadline, the

11

parties were fully aware of when the deadline was.

12

was presented to the Court and the Court waited five days

13

plus three days mailing before entering that order to make

14

sure there was no objection to that order.

15

objection to that order.

16

The order

There was no

Also, I am concerned that the responses that were

17

filed frankly don't appear to be fully responsive even at

18

this point.

19

enough enough.

20

It seems to me that there is a time to call
And I think this is it.

It seems to me that A.J. Dean has not conducted

21

itself appropriately.

It certainly hasn't complied with the

22

Court order.

23

side are obligated to go to the great extent that they have,

24

the Roberts have gone to in this case to get what they are

25

entitled to without filing any motions.

And I don't think that parties on the other

23

1

As I say, if this were the first conversation we

2

were having about this, I might view this significantly

3

differently.

4

But it isn't.

And so

—

Also in my mind there is no lack of clarity about

5

substitution of counsel.

It was clear Mr. Marshall intended

6

to withdraw.

7

here today.

8

withdraw when there are pending motions because of concerns

9

of delay.

That was the whole —

that was even discussed

And the rules clearly do not permit counsel to

And I have those concerns in this case that there

10

might be delay if the Court permitted withdrawal.

11

withdrawal was not permitted before this time.

12

That's why

A party has every right to have as many counsel as

13

a party wishes, in my opinion.

14

do so must see to it that counsel have an obligation to

15

communicate with one another.

16

But the party that chooses to

I am not trying to sound overly critical of

17

counsel here.

18

there has been a dramatic lack of cooperation on the part of

19

A.J. Dean and failure to comply with the Court's order.

20

That's not my intent.

But the facts are that

I think I am well within my discretion in granting

2\

the relief that the plaintiff seeks.

22

Answers of A.J. Dean are hereby stricken and default judgment

23

is entered against A.J. Dean.

24
25

Accordingly, the

The motion is granted.

I want Mr. Rencher to prepare an order consistent
with that ruling.
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MILTON MUIR dba MILTON MUIR
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
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SHEILA ROBERTS,
Third-Party Defendant
and Third-Party
Crossclaimant.

Judge Anne M. Stirba

On Monday, June 27, 1994, the parties through counsel appeared
before the Court. Plaintiffs and third-party defendant and thirdparty crossclaimant were represented by Jaryl L. Rencher; Milton

Muir Construction Company, Milton Muir and Katheryne Muir were
represented

by Randy

Birch; and A.J. Dean was represented

Randall Marshall and Scott Berry.
motion

for

summary

judgment

by

Before the Court were Roberts'

against

all

defendants, Roberts'

objection to A.J. Dean's attempt to substitute counsel, Roberts'
opposition to the request of A.J. Dean's counsel to withdraw and
appearance of co-counsel on behalf of A.J. Dean, Roberts' motion to
strike A.J. Dean's pleadings and for entry of default for A.J.
Dean's

failure

to

comply

with

this

Court's

prior

order

and

discovery responsibilities, A.J. Dean's motion for additional time
to answer discovery and Roberts' objection thereto, A.J. Dean's
motion

for relief

from Court's orders and Roberts' opposition

thereto, Roberts' motion to amend complaint, Roberts' motion for
partial summary judgment, A.J. Dean's motion for summary judgment,
attorney Randall Marshall's motion to withdraw, and A.J. Dean's
objection to service of pleadings.
Counsel was given opportunity to fully brief the Court on
these matters and to argue the same before the bench.
The Court, being fully advised as to the law, the facts, the
record

in

this

participation

of

case,
counsel

its
and

prior
the

rulings
arguments

and

orders,

raised,

and

the
while

incorporating herein its entire rulings on March 21, 1994, and
June 27, 1994, as that ruling is reported on the record, now hereby
enters its
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On March 21, 1994, after A.J. Dean had repeatedly failed

to comply with the rules of discovery as described by plaintiffs in
their memorandum in support of their motion to compel, incorporated
herein by this reference, this Court ordered A.J. Dean to respond
to discovery by April 5, 1994.

Counsel for A.J. Dean was present

in court for the ruling and received a copy and never opposed the
form of the proposed order reflecting this ruling.

The Court's

conclusions and ruling made that date as well as the statement of
facts and argument (adopted by the Court and raised by Roberts in
i

seeking the Court's March 21, 1994 ruling) are hereby incorporated
into the Court's findings.
2.

As part of its March 21, 1994 ruling, this Court had

considered the argument raised by counsel for the parties and was
otherwise fully advised as to the law, the facts and the record in
this case and for good cause granted Roberts' motion to compel and
for sanctions and ordered A.J. Dean to answer certain discovery
previously propounded on it by April 5, 1994. The Court concluded:
"In the even that A.J. Dean and Sons, Inc., does not comply with
this order, Roberts may, ex parte, submit an affidavit and motion
to strike A.J. Dean and Sons, Inc.'s pleadings and for entry of
default against them."
3.

During the March 21, 1994 hearing, counsel for A.J. Dean

was present (Mr. Randall Marshall) and the Court asked that counsel
whether there would be enough time for A.J. Dean to respond to the

3
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discovery ordered by April 5, and A.J. Dean's counsel indicated
that would be sufficient.
4.
found

Also as part of its ruling on March 21, 1994, the Court

that

Roberts' request

for

attorney

fees

and

costs

was

appropriate and granted the same.
5.

On or about March 28, 1994, without court approval or

order, attorney Julie Lund attempted to substitute herself

for

Mr. Randall Marshall as A.J. Dean's counsel in this case.
6.

On April 6, 1994, Mr. Marshall, counsel for A.J. Dean,

participated in a telephone conference requested by this Court
dealing with issues of defendant Muirs' own failure to respond to
this Court's earlier order regarding a discovery deadline on March
25, 1994,
7.

In that April 6, 1994 telephone conference, the Court

indicated to counsel for A.J. Dean (Randall Marshall) that he could
not withdraw as counsel or be substituted without an order of this
Court.
8.
appearance

On April 11, 1994, attorneys Green & Berry entered their
as

co-counsel

in

this

case

since

they

were

not

authorized to substitute themselves as counsel for Mr. Marshall.
9.

Having not received A.J. Dean's discovery pursuant to

this Count's March 21, 1994 ruling, Roberts' counsel called Green
& Berry on April 12 and April 13, 1994, and requested the Court's
ordered discovery.

Also on or about April 13, 1994, plaintiffs'

4
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counsel again reminded Green & Berry of the Court's March 21, 1994
ruling and provided a copy of that order to Green & Berry.
10.

A.J. Dean never timely responded or complied with this

Court's order of March 21, 1994, or the repeated courtesy requests
of Roberts' counsel to receive the discovery answers.
11.

During

this

entire

period

A.J.

Dean

and

Sons

was

represented by counsel.
12.
1994,

and

In full compliance with this Court's ruling or March 21,
after courteously

(but without

result

or

response)

providing A.J. Dean's counsel with a copy of the Court's proposed
order and contacting Green & Berry three times regarding the same
(even though such contact was not required by this Court's rules or
rulings), on or about April 18, 1994, Roberts filed their motion to
strike defendant A.J. Dean's pleadings and for entry of default.
This motion was courteously served upon A.J. Dean even though the
Court's March 21, 1994 order expressly stated that Roberts could
make this motion ex-parte.
13.

A.J. Dean has not alleged that it and its counsel at all

material times in this matter, Randall Marshall, did not receive
everything filed with this Court.
14.

Not only was A.J. Dean's counsel Randall Marshall fully

advised as to the facts and all papers filed with this Court, but
the record also reflects that the Court did not sign its order
regarding its March 21, 1994 ruling until eight days after A.J.
Dean was served with a copy of the Court's order, which period gave

5
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A.J. Dean sufficient time under Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration to object to the form of the order.

No

objection was filed, and to date no objection has been made to that
order as not reflecting the Court's ruling.
15.

Although A.J. Dean claims that Mr. Scott Berry earlier

appeared as counsel in this case
"substitution

(based upon a March 29, 1994

of counsel" that does

not even

list his

name),

substitution of counsel had not been authorized by the Court and
such authorization was required by this Court's rules given pending
motions.

Further, Roberts repeatedly opposed the withdrawal of

A.J. Dean's attorney Randall Marshall due to pending motions.
16.

Also, contrary to A.J. Dean's allegations, Ms. Julie Lund

was timely placed on the certificate of service, even though she
had not appeared as counsel.
17.

A.J. Dean has made no attempt to represent to the Court

the types of admissions or the responses that would be made to
plaintiffs' request for admissions if the Court were to allow A.J.
Dean to withdraw the same, and there is no evidence that any
individual on behalf of A.J. Dean was willing to sign any proposed
responses; in fact, the evidence of record indicated no one would
sign proposed responses on behalf of A.J. Dean.
18.

On June 27, 1994, the Court heard from counsel concerning

the motions and matters listed above, and A.J. Dean admitted,
through counsel, that Randall Marshall had not been given leave of
court to withdraw, which leave was required by this Court's rules.
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A.J. Dean's counsel also admitted it knew of no legal support for
its claim that several attorneys acting on behalf of A.J. Dean, in
a single matter, with or without court approval, were entitled to
be served with a copy of all papers filed with the Court.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court now enters its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

While attorneys Green & Berry for the first time on

April 14, 1994, requested additional time to answer this discovery,
there has been no good cause shown for why A.J. Dean has not
complied with this Court's express orders regarding discovery, even
though A.J. Dean has been at all times represented by counsel in
this case.

Further, A.J. Dean's motion to extend time to respond

to discovery ignores the fact that Green & Berry were not counsel
for A.J. Dean in this case and that A.J. Dean's attorney Mr.
Randall Marshall received the Court's orders and appeared in open
court when the Court ruled that A.J. Dean had only until April 5,
1994, to answer the discovery.
2.

Under

Utah

R.

Civ.

P.

6(b)

the

time

for

enlarging

discovery without A.J. Dean showing "excusable neglect" has run,
and A.J. Dean has not shown excusable neglect.
3.

Roberts

have

been

prejudiced

and

have

incurred

considerable time and expense trying to compel defendants to comply
with discovery responsibilities.

Defendants, although represented

by counsel at all times, have ignored the orders of this Court and
have not demonstrated good cause for why additional time to comply

7

with this Court's order ought to be allowed.

Accordingly Roberts

are entitled to an order granting their motion to strike A.J.
Dean's pleadings and to enter default against A.J. Dean.
4.

The objection to unserved pleadings filed by Green &

Berry on April 14, 1994, is erroneous and has no effect as a matter
of law.

A.J. Dean's counsel essentially acknowledged Rule 5(b) of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure only requires that Roberts serve
all matters upon the party's "attorney."

Nowhere in this Court's

rules were Roberts required to serve pleadings upon attorneys that
had improperly attempted a substitution of counsel without order of
this Court required by Rule 4-506(1) of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration.
5.

Further, the objection to unserved pleadings by attorneys

Green & Berry is without merit since the record reflects Green
& Berry attempted to appear on this case on April 11, 1994, and
there is no claim in their objection now before this Court that any
matters were filed after April 11, 1994, to which A.J. Dean or
attorneys Berry & Green did not receive notice.
6.

The Court rejects A.J. Dean's claim that Roberts' counsel

should have sent attorneys Green & Berry matters that were filed
before Green & Berry were entitled to act as counsel in this case.
7.

Even if the Court were inclined to adopt A.J. Dean's

claim, which it does not, attorney Raymond Scott Berry did not
enter his appearance in this action on March 29, 1994.

As the

record reflects,- he only properly entered that appearance (as co-

8
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counsel) some two weeks later on April 11, 1994. At that time A.J.
Dean had in all respects been represented by counsel.
8.

No objection was filed, and to date no objection has been

made to the form of the Court's orders as not reflecting the
Court's ruling.
9.

The attempted substitution of Julie Lund on March 29,

1994, was not authorized under Rule 4-506 of the Utah Code of
Judicial
withdraw.

Administration

as Mr. Marshall was

not

authorized

to

This Court informed A.J. Dean's counsel of that fact in

its telephone conference initiated to counsel on April 6, 1994.
Accordingly, even if this Court accepts A.J. Dean's claim that
three co-counsel in any case should be provided duplicative copies
of ^11 matters

filed, Mr. Berry was not an attorney

properly

appearing in this case until April 11, 1994.
10.

A.J. Dean evidently knew this fact as it failed in its

own certificates of service to copy Mr. Randall Marshall of the
papers Mr. Berry filed.
11.

A.J. Dean has effectively conceded the point that at all

times material herein it was represented by Mr. Randall Marshall
who has never been authorized to withdraw under Rule 4-506(a).

If

A.J. Dean has a dispute with whether its attorney failed to comply
with the Court's March 21, 1994 order requiring A.J. Dean to answer
all outstanding discovery by April 5, 1994, that dispute does not
involve Roberts. Likewise, if A.J. Dean's co-counsel has a dispute
with information he was or was not provided by A.J. Dean's counsel

9
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who appeared in that March 21, 1994 hearing, that argument is also
irrelevant to Roberts 7 claims in this case.

This Court cannot

allow A.J. Dean to penalize Roberts (who have at all times complied
with discovery responsibilities) as a result of disputes between
A.J. Dean and its respective counsel as to who was required to
comply with the Court's March 21, 1994 order.
12.

The record belies any claim that Roberts did not object

to the attempted withdrawal by Mr. Randall Marshall as counsel for
A.J. Dean in this case as the record demonstrates that two such
objections were filed.
13.

While A.J. Dean effectively claims that A.J. Dean was

somehow prejudiced by Mr. Berry's inability to participate in a
telephone conference

scheduled by the Court on April 6, 1994,

Mr. Berry had not filed an actual appearance as of that time and it
was for A.J. Dean's counsel who was present to educate the Court if
Mr.

Berry

should

communication.
attorneys.

have

been

involved

in

that

telephone

Again, A.J. Dean's dispute, if any, is with its

It would be inappropriate to penalize Roberts for any

lack of communication between A.J. Dean's purported "co-counsel."
14.

Nowhere in this Court's rules were Roberts required to

serve pleadings upon attorneys that had attempted a substitution of
counsel without the order of this Court required by Rule 4-506(1)
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.

Further, if one of

A.J.

should

Dean's

attorneys

thought

that

another

be

further

involved in communications with the Court, that attorney had every

10

opportunity to raise this point and chose not to do so. Nowhere in
any of the documents on file with this Court has A.J. Dean's
attorney, Mr. Marshall, claimed by sworn affidavit or otherwise
that} (1) he did not receive, as A.J. Dean's counsel, all material
matters that were filed in this case, (2) he did not appear on
March 21, 1994, as counsel for A.J. Dean when the Court ordered
A.JH

Dean to comply with discovery responsibilities by April 5,

1994, and (3) he did not participate in the telephone conversation
with the Court on April 6, 1994.

To the contrary, the record

reflects the fact that A.J. Dean appeared through counsel and was
properly served with all filings in this case.
' 15.

A.J. Dean has failed to comply with any obligation to

demonstrate

that

it

is

entitled

to relief

on the grounds

inadvertent surprise and/or excusable neglect.

of

In contrast, as

demonstrated in the record, although no rule of or ruling by this
Court required it, before Roberts' counsel filed a motion to strike
and for entry of default, he contacted the law offices of Green &
Berry several times before submitting Roberts' motion for default,
which motion had been earlier authorized by this Court.
[

16.

Under Rule

37(b)(2), this Court was well within its

discretion to compel this discovery and is now well within its
I
discretion under subparagraph (c) thereof to strike A.J. Dean's
pleadings and grant Roberts a default judgment.
consistently

and willfully

A.J. Dean has

failed to comply with this Court's

orders and A.J. Dean's discovery responsibilities, even to the

11

point when the Court in open court on March 21, 1994, gave it one
more chance to do so and entered an order of attorney fees in favor
of Roberts.

A.J. Dean chose not to respond, even though it was at

all times representf i by counsel.

In contrast, Roberts and their

crinsel have at all times complied with this Court's rules and
rulings and courteous practice and have been prejudiced by A.J.
Dean's inappropriate and willful disregard for this Court's orders
and what must be viewed as an intent to hinder or delay discovery.
To allow A.J. Dean, without any evidence, to avoid this Court's
orders

and its willful behavior by

simply claiming

"excusable

neglect" or inadvertence of surprise would be to sanction an abuse
of process and would further prejudice Roberts.
17.

Contrary

memorandum, Roberts

to

the

representations

have demonstrated

in

A.J.

to the Court the

Dean's
severe

prejudice that would result if this Court sets aside its order and
does not grant Roberts' motion to strike A.J. Dean's pleadings and
for default.

Further, Roberts have incurred substantial attorney

fees, and there is no representation in A.J. Dean's memorandum that
in exchange for late discovery and failure to comply with court
order it will pay Roberts' attorney fees.

And, contrary to its

claim that the attorney fees should not have been awarded against
it, those fees were awarded based upon its first failure to comply
with discovery as required under the mandatory language of Rule 37
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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18.

Nowhere in its memorandum has A.J. Dean cited this Court

to a single case in support of its position.

In contrast, a review

of Utah case law demonstrates that A.J. Dean has not established
inadvertence, excusable

neglect

or

surprise

to

set aside

the

Court's default judgment even if plaintiffs' motion was timely at
this juncture.
19.

Utah

law

provides

that

discovery

answers

that

are

attempted to be filed after a motion to compel or for sanctions is
filed will not avoid the granting of a motion for sanctions or

I
relief.
20.

In this case and under the facts as they occurred, A.J.

Dean's willful failure to comply with this Court's prior orders and
to

respond

to

discovery

is

not

insignificant.

The

Court

references, incorporates and acknowledges its order signed April 7,
1994,

and

entered

March

21,

1994,

regarding

sanctions

and

compelling A.J. Dean's response to recovery.
21.

The Court is concerned by its finding that this is the

second time the Court has had to deal with these kinds of problems
in formal motions insofar as A.J. Dean's willful failure to comply
with discovery responsibilities.
22.

The Court concludes that A.J. Dean's answers to discovery

were not timely filed contrary to the Court's order, which followed
recognition by the Court that A.J. Dean's answers had not been
given timely in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The

Court concludes that there has been a willful pattern of delay by
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A.J. Dean and a willful pattern on the part of A.J. Dean of not
being fully responsive.

The Court also concludes that the motion

for extension of time was not timely filed.
23.

The Court also concludes that the responses that A.J.

Dean filed do not appear to be fully responsive even at this point
and that A.J. Dean has not conducted itself appropriately.

A.J.

Dean has not complied with the Court's order and plaintiffs are not
obligated to go to the great extent that they have in this case to
obtain the discovery to which they are entitled without filing any
motions.
24.

Prior to its hearing on June 27, 1994, the Court also did

not allow Mr. Marshall to withdraw in this case in order that the
Court could avoid any concerns of delay.
25.

A party has every right to have as many counsel as a

party wishes, but the party that chooses to do so (in this case
A.J. Dean) must see to it that counsel have an obligation to
communicate with one another.

To the extent this was not done,

A.J. Dean may not place the responsibility or blame for the same on
plaintiffs.
26.

The Court concludes that there has been a dramatic lack

of cooperation on the part of A.J. Dean and failure to comply with
the Court's March 21, 1994 and April 7, 1994 orders.
the

Court

is

within

its

discretion

in

granting

Accordingly,
the

relief

plaintiffs seek and the pleadings of A.J. Dean are thus stricken
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and default judgment is entered against A.J. Dean.

Plaintiffs'

motion is granted.
27.

As a result of the Court's order, A.J. Dean's motions for

additional time to answer discovery and for relief from the Court's
orders of March 21 and April 7, 1994, are denied.

Further, A.J.

Dean's objection to unserved pleadings is overruled and its motion
for summary judgment denied.
28.

A.J. Dean's counsel is given until July 8 to file a

subsequent motion on whether it is entitled to be heard on the
issue of damages.
29.

The

Court,

having

considered

brief

argument

by

plaintiffs' counsel as to other motions, the Court reserves for a
later date ruling on Roberts' remaining motions including Roberts'
motion to amend complaint and for partial summary judgment.

The

Court will also hold a hearing on the issue of damages Roberts are
entitled

to receive

from A.J. Dean.

This hearing on damages

against A.J. Dean will be held subsequent to a hearing scheduled
for August 23, 1994, to consider A.J. Dean's request that it be
heard in respect to plaintiffs' presentation of damages to be
awarded against it. .
DATED this

i&

day of
BY THE COURT

District Court Judg
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)

Case No. 930901740CV
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MILTON MUIR CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, A.J. DEAN CEMENT
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A.J. DEAN & SONS, INC.;
MILTON MUIR; KATHERYNE MUIR,
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ANNE M. STIR3A, sitting as Judge in the above-named Court

2

fot the purpose of this cause, and that the following

3

proceedings were had.
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6

For the Plaintiffs •

7
8
9
10

For the Defendant,
A.J. Dean Cement:

11
12
13
14
15
16

For the Defendants r
Muir:

REID W. LAMBERT
Attorney at Law
Woodbury & Kesler, P.C.
265 East 200 South, Suite 300
P.O. Box 3358
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3353
RAYMOND SCOTT BERRY
Attorney at Law
Green & Berry
10 Exchange Place, #622
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
RANDY B. BIRCH
Attorney at Law
Bertch & Birch
2964 West 4700 South, #210
Salt Lake City, Utah
34113
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18

* * *

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
2

1
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2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

THE COURT:

evidence and arguments, Counsel, and on most of these
issues, I'm prepared to rule, except for the ones that I
specifically set aside.
'

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25 !

That has--that is

the motion by the plaintiffs to strike the memorandum and
proposed-MR. LAMBERT:

13
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First of all, there was also a motion to strike

and that has not been erased by counsel.

12

14

Well, I've considered the

THE COURT:
A.J. Dean.

Pioffer.
--proffer of evidence by

And the Court hereby strikes that motion--or--or

rather, grants that motion and also because--I'11

strike

that m o t i o n — o r grant that motion.
Was there a request for attorney's fees in
connection with that motion?

I don't happen to recall.

MR. LAMBERT:
THE COURT:
MR. LAMBERT:

NOf
Okay.
And it wouldn't be very

much, if there were, so I'll waive my claims.
THE COURT:

Very well.

As to the liquidated damages, the Court has
already the amount as $9,458 and as to the lien
3

1
2
3
4
5

satisfaction, subject to check, if — I'm assuming that the
date given in the proceedings is correct and I've not
independently assessed it, but if that's the date, then I
entered the order of the default and that is the effective
date, and not a prior date.

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A bench ruling is only a bench ruling and this one
is, it's effective when it's reduced to writing and there's
an opportunity for objection to that and then I enter the
order.

Not even when I sign it is it entered, it's when

it's entered by the clerk of the court, the case law is
quite clear about that.
So, those dates, assuming that it is that December
5th day, 1994, and subject to check Mr. Lambert's
mathematical calculation, judgment is entered in the amount
of $10,900.
With regard to the repair of the driveway, I am
satisfied that, based on the Court's previous rulings and
notwithstanding the argument that it is claimed that somehow
it wasn't necessary, the Court has found that that is a
damage figure.

The concrete, itself, that's what the

essence of this lawsuit is all about and judgment has been
awarded from the bench based on the prima facie showing.
Therefore, the best evidence of what the repair of
the driveway is, is $7,960.01.

The Court, I'll show, enter

judgment in that amount in favor of the plaintiffs.
4

1

With regard to the repair of the rain gutter, the

2

two figures that were produced was $100 and then $170, and

3

the Court awards the amtfunt that--the amount of $170. That

4

is because the—that is the cost as of the date of trial, if

5 I you will, on the issue of damages
And so even if that figure were to go up following
7

today, but after the date that judgment — after this date,

8

but before a judgment is entered in this case, the $170

^ J figure will control
10

The repair of the lawn.

11

that, it's undisputed.

There is evidence about

A judgment shall enter in the amount

12

| of $490

13

I

14

I fees and there will be a briefing by the plaintiffs on the

The Court reserves the issue of the attorney's

15

issues of the—on whether attorney's fees are appropriate

16

and recoverable in actions to quiet title, whether they're

17 J recoverable as special damages under a slander of title
13

I claim and whether attorney's fees are recoverable as — a s

19 I consequential damages based on the claim that they are the
20

natural and foreseeable consequences of the lien.

21

plaintiffs shall be able to brief that issue.

22

I

So, the

With regard to the reasonableness and necessity of

23

fees, and--which has to do specifically with the issue of

24

whether the—what reasonable and necessarily incurred fees

25

J are there relating solely to the A.J. Dean defendant, and
5

then whatever arguments are made as to how, if at all, those
2
fees should break down to the specific causes of action on
which the judgment is being entered.

That is something A.J.

Dean may participate in.
The briefing on that shall be--I would like to get
this resolved as quickly as possible.

Mr. Lambert, how

quickly can you prepare this--that--that, in essence,
9

I

10

'

11

written closing argument I want to see on that issue—
MR. LAMBERT: Well, I wish-THE COURT:
other three matters?

12
13
14
15
16
17

MR. LAMBERT:

20
21
22
23
24

I wish I could tell you I

could do it faster, but I really don't have any time at all
this week.

I'm going out of town on Thursday.

I could

certainly do it by a week from Friday.
THE COURT:
MR. LAMBERT:

18
19

— a n d briefing as to the

THE COURT:

The 23rd of August?
Right.
All right.

Then that needs

to be filed with the Court no later than 5:00 p.m. on
Friday, August 23rd.
Mr. Berry, is there any reason why you could not
respond to that within ten days as you would a motion?
MR. BERRY:

There is, your Honor.

I'm

glad you're giving me an opportunity to mention this.

I'm

25
going to be out of town beginning Monday for three weeks.

I
6

1
2
3
4

/ woii * tbe
}

ba ek until Sep!:ember

&\:h.

THE COURT:

(
>1

All right.

Then you may —

I1 11 tak<t a few of those

HR. LAMBERT'

extra days if we're giving them out.

5

THE COURT;

All right.

Why doxx' t th%n

6

the p laintiffs file the;Lr—-all right

7

have until September 3r<1 becausea Mr. Berry won't be there

8

even to see•it.

9

the 18th of Septemb er?

The plaintiff s may

Mr . Berry then, cant you respond to that by

10

MR. BERRY:

Yes, your 1Honor.

11

THE COURT:

All right.

12

13
14

And do so.

Five

( days for a reply to that, if any, and in accordance with
Rule 4-501.
MR. LAMBERT :

Your Honor, my argument's

15

only to be about a reasonableness and neces — the

16

reasonableness and the necessit y of fees as to these special

17

three causes of action?

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT:

No.

No. You don't address

the special three causes of action at all.
MR. LAMBERT:

So, it's the

reasonableness and necessity —
THE COURT: It's only,

in

essence,

closing argument on the issues of whether attorney's fees
can—should be awarded—
MR. LAMBERT:

Apportioning the fees

J

1

among the c1 aims?

2
3
4
5

THE COURT:

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Apportionment among

the defendants and among the claims themselves.

That's what

your closing arguments needs to be--needs to be addressed
to.

6
7

Yeah.

Attorney's fees will be awarded, at least in part,
because the Court has ruled that way as to the mechanic's
1i ens.
The question is then, based on the evidence, can
the Court assess what those fees are pertaining to that or
any other specific cause of action based on the evidence in
which you have participated and whether—what your closing
argument would be insofar as how to allocate that between
A.J. Dean and any other defendant.
MR. LAMBERT:
THE COURT:

Okay.

All right. Now, finally,

theni, with regard to punitive damages.

This has been an

18

odys sey, this has- -this case has—was filed i n - this case

19

would not have even been filed in District Court had there

20

not been claims re lated to quiet title and other claims that

21

would bring it in to the District Court, probabl y because

22

the jurisdictional limits would have been too small.

23

We don't have those distinctions now o f District

24

and Circuit Court; however, this — the bottom line, what this

25

case» first involved was the repair of the driveway and
3

1

gutter, lawn and those—those specific damages.

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Because of the recalcitrance of A.J. Dean, which
is plainly demonstrated, even by their own pleadings in the
case, there has been a consistent and clear course of
conduct by A.J. Dean since the beginning, well, since they,
at first made efforts to attempt to collect its bill in the
unlawful manner in which it did, misconduct, willful and
malicious behavior on the part of A.J. Dean, bad faith,
deception and A.J. Dean now makes the argument that the
first call to Mrs. Roberts was one to two minutes and all
they wanted—all they said was that she would have—that she
and her husband would have to pay the bill or else the house
would be sold within three days.

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

That is an astonishing statement to make.

I have

yet to hear any case in which I have ever been involved as a
judge or an attorney, of a collector making a call like that
and threatening a home owner out of the blue with such a
claim.

It is highly offensive, it is highly inappropriate

and with no other evidence about A.J. Dean's conduct, in my
opinion, constitutes conduct that warrants punitive damages.
But there is more, even after the conversation
with Mr. Rencher and Mr. Rencher indicated that there was no
valid claim for the lien against the Roberts, A.J. Dean went
out and yet again misconducted itself in a way that was
clearly willful, malicious and in bad faith.
9

1

Iaferentially, that also adds to the previous

2 conduct that this is a —clearly suggestive of a course of
3 business conduct by A.J. Dean and how it collects its bills
4 from its customers.
5

And I don't think there is any question whatsoever

6 about the punitive, about the inappropriate, malicious,
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

willful conduct about A.J. Dean.
As to whether it's clear — established by clear and
convincing, I would say in essence, it was essentially
undisputed and I am aware, as Mr. Berry and A.J. Dean
pointed out, on numerous, numerous occasions, that they have
not been able to present evidence about this; however, that
is through no one's fault but A.J. Dean's and how it has
conducted itself in this case.
This default—A.J. Dean's answer has been stricken
and it stands as if it never answered in this case.

It has

very few rights after entry of default and the default was
based on its misconduct, t o — t o appear and—and challenge
any con—any—any evidence put forward by the plaintiffs.
But clearly, it does not have an opportunity or a

21
right to put on evidence

in contradiction to the evidence as

22
it is alleged in the complaint.
23
in addition to that, if all of that were not
24
enough, A.J. Dean clearly misconducted itself, knowingly,
25
and evidently, as a pattern of behavior, by having another
10

1 individual sign the name of Craig Dean, purporting to be the
2 signature of Craig Dean and then having that signature
3 notarized, knowing that it is not the signature of A.J. Dean
4 and that A.J. Dean did not, contrary to the notary's claim,
5 under oath, appear before the notary and sign that specific
6 document.
7
And so clearly, the notary provisions and lien
8 provisions have been undermined by the conduct of A.J. Dean.
9

The--oh, it's the Robert Bagley telephone calls to

10 the plaintiff about--to which 1 was referring before.
11
Now, also, the letter by Roberts that Mr.--or
12

13

letter to Hr. Roberts by Bagley that Mr. Roberts would be
liable for costs and attorney's fees which occurred a few

14 days after Mr. Rencher's conversation with A.3. Dean is the
15 other example to which I was referring.
16
I'm not including everything the Roberts may
17 include in the findings of fact and conclusions of law that
18

they proposed, additional evidence consistent with the

19

evidence produced today; I am--this is merely a bench ruling

20

and I will surely overlook some—some evidence.

21
22
23
24
25

The fees of counsel in connection with these
proceedings, Mr. Rencher of $85 an hour and Mr. Lambert of
$110 an hour are both clearly reasonable and consistent with
the standards in this legal community.
I am aware of the pixie_Barjk case, the Bracken vs.
11

1
2
3
4

Dixie Bank, I believe it is, or vice versa, Dixie Bank vs.
Bracken, on those factors.
all those factors here.

I will not bother to articulate

This is an unusual case.

Clearly, the legal fees far exceed what legal fees

5 should have been, but the Court finds that those fees, to a
6 tremendous extent, were incurred because of A.J. Dean's
7 misconduct consistent—consistently in this case.
8
9

With regard to Mr. Lambert's fees, the Court finds
that one hundred percent or his time has been devoted to

10 A.J. Dean issues and--and also as to the allocation of the
11

attorney's fees, I am not going to reach that today because

12

of the issue of briefing that needs to be done.

13
14
15
16
17

As to Mr. Rencher's fees, I'm reserving on those
issues as well.
And other findings regarding reasonableness and
necessity are--are reserved.
I want Mr. Lambert to prepare proposed findings of

18

fact and conclusions of law and decree, and his attorney's

19

fees incurred in connection with doing that and until this

20

matter is resolved, may also be awarded consistent with the

21

basis for the Court's rulings here today.

22

That is the--the bench ruling of the Court.

23

Is there anything I've overlooked?

24
25

MR. LAMBERT:

If you wanted to put a

number on the punitive damage.
12

THE COURT:

I'm going to wait to look at

the whole picture before I do that.

I think that--so, when

you prepare that, you need to leave a blank for it.
I--I want to look at all the findings, I want to
consider the specials awarded and look at the--any--the
6

J resolution of all of the issues before I make that decision.

7

'

8
9

MR. LAMBERT:

I appreciate that

I'll — I'll submit also, at least it's my
J understanding, a similar type of thing with regard to fees,

10

leaving enough blanks that the Court could--could fill it

11

in, based on our--our pleadings.

12

THE COURT:

13

All right.

Thank you.

And the Court is adjourned at this time.

14

MR. BERRY:
I

Thank you, your Honor.

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

16
17

* * *

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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265 East 100 South, Suite 300
P. 0. Box 3358
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3358
Telephone: (801) 364-1100
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERTS, et

al.,

Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
MILTON MUIR CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC., et al.
Defendants.
MUIR, et al.
Case No. 930901740 CV
Third-Party Plaintiff,
Judge Anne M. Stirba
vs.
ROBERTS,
Third-Party Defendant.

This matter came before the Court for a hearing relative to
the issue of damages as against Defendant A.J. Dean & Sons, Inc.
("A.J. Dean") on August 13, 1996. Prior to the hearing, the Court
found and ordered that Defendant A.J. Dean was in default as a
sanction pursuant to Rule 37 (b) (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil

009

Procedure for its failure timely to comply with the Court's Order
compelling discovery.

By an Order dated December 5, 1994, the

Court ordered that Plaintiff appear at the August 13, 1997 hearing
and present by proffer prima facie evidence establishing a factual
basis for its claims against A.J. Dean set forth in its Second
Amended Complaint ("Complaint").
Defendant,

by

its

counsel,

The Court further ordered that

could

not

participate

in

the

presentation of evidence except to cross-examine witnesses as to
the issue of damages and to present argument. At the close of the
hearing, the Court made its ruling on the record, but directed that
further briefing be submitted on the issue of attorneys fees.
Having now considered the evidence presented by proffer and live
testimony

at

the hearing,

having

read

the

parties' written

submissions, having heard argument, and being fully advised herein,
the Court now makes the following findings of fact and conclusions
of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiffs and Defendants are both residents of Salt Lake

County, Utah.
2.

The claims at issue arose from transactions taking place

in Salt Lake County, Utah.
3.

Plaintiffs have established a factual basis for their

Second Claim for Relief, Trespass, as against Defendant A.J. Dean
-2-
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in that A.J. Dean did enter the land of Plaintiffs without consent
and did cause damage thereon.
4.

By virtue of Plaintiff's trespass, Plaintiffs suffered

damages in the amount of $7,960.00 to replace their driveway,
$170.00 to repair their damaged rain gutter, and $490.00 to repair
their lawn and landscaping, for a total of $8,620.00.
5.

Plaintiffs have established a factual basis for their

Fourth Claim for Relief, Negligence, as against Defendant A.J. Dean
in that A.J. Dean breached its duty of reasonable and ordinary care
to Plaintiffs by damaging Plaintiffs property and installing a
defective driveway at their residence.
6.

A.J. Dean's negligence has proximately caused damages to

Plaintiffs in the total amount o£ $8,620.00 as broken down in
paragraph 4 above.
7.

Plaintiffs have established a factual basis for their

Seventh Claim for Relief, Breach of Warranty, as against Defendant
A.J. Dean, in that A.J. Dean had good reason to know the particular
purpose for which the driveway was intended, A.J. Dean knew that
the Plaintiffs were relying upon its skill and ability in providing
materials for the job, and A.J. Dean failed to provide materials in
a manner consistent with that warranty resulting in a defective
driveway being installed.

The Court further finds that the

-3-
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warranty extends to the Plaintiffs, who were reasonably expected to
use the driveway.
8.

A.J.

Dean's

breach

of

warranty

directly

damaged

Plaintiffs in the amount of $7,960.01, as the cost of repairing and
replacing the defective driveway.
9.

Plaintiffs have established a factual basis for their

Thirteenth claim for Relief, Satisfaction of Lien, as against
Defendant A.J. Dean in that Plaintiffs in that Plaintiffs duly
delivered notice to A.J. Dean of satisfaction of the lien on June
8, 1993, but A.J. Dean refused to respond or release the lien at
least until the date of its Default in this action which was
December 5, 1994.
10.

By virtue of A.J. Dean's refusal to release the lien,

Plaintiffs are entitled to $20.00 per day as a penalty from June 8,
1993 through December 5, 1994, totalling $10,900.00.
11.

Plaintiffs have established a factual basis for their

Fourteenth Claim for Relief, wrongful lien as against A.J. Dean in
two regards:
(a)

Plaintiffs

have

established

the

Plaintiffs

are

entitled to an order quieting title to the property at issue
in favor of Plaintiffs in that A.J. Dean's mechanics lien was
wrongfully executed and recorded.

-4-
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(b)

Plaintiffs have established slander of title in that

A.J. Dean's

filing

of a mechanic's

lien was a written

publication which was false, because the lien was wrongfully
executed and recorded, and that A.J. Dean did publish or did
refuse to retract such statement with actual malice.
12.

A.J. Dean's wrongful filing of an invalid lien did

proximately cause damage to Plaintiffs in the amount of $9,458.00
as the value of the lost opportunity to refinance their mortgage at
a favorable interest rate.
13.

With regard to Plaintiffs' Fifteenth Claim for Relief,

Punitive Damages, the Court finds that A.J. Dean's conduct relative
to the above was willful and malicious and was taken with a
disregard

for the rights of the Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs are

therefore entitled to^ an award of punitive damages in an amount
sufficient to punish A.J. Dean and serve as a deterrent to others,
which the Court determines to be b {&X^t S^>
14.

.

The Court further orders that Plaintiffs are entitled to

recover attorneys fees as discussed in the Conclusions of Law
below.

Plaintiffs have incurred attorneys fees as follows:
(a) The Court finds that Plaintiffs incurred fees

to Jarryl Rencher and the firm of Hanson, Epperson. &
Smith

in

the

amdtint

of

$18,200.00

between

the

commencement of representation and July of 1994, when a
-5-
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conflict of interest first arose at the Hanson, Epperson
& Smith law firm.

This time is computed at $85.00 per

hour, and the Court finds that the total fee and the
hourly fee were reasonable and appropriate under the
circumstances of this case.
(b) The Court finds that Plaintiffs have incurred
fees to Reid W. Lambert and the firm of Woodbury &
Kesler,

P.C.

in

the

amount

of

$5,115.00

from

the

commencement of its representation through the present.
15.

Based on the evidence at trial and the written memoranda

filed by the parties, the Court now finds that of the total
attorneys

fees

Afr

of

$23,315.00
arose

from

of
the

attorneys
claims

fees

incurred,

for wrongful

lien

asserted against A.J. Dean, and may be recovered in this action.
16.

The Court expressly finds that there is no just reason .

for delay of the entry of a final judgment as to A.J. Dean.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendant A.J. Dean is in default by virtue of its

failure to comply with the Court's Order compelling discovery, and
default

judgment

shall

therefore

enter

to

the

extent

that

Plaintiffs have established a prima facie basis for their claims
against A.J. Dean and can demonstrate a factual basis for the award
of damages.
-6-

002347

2.

As set forth above, Plaintiffs have established prima

facie evidence of their claims against Defendants on the following
claims:

3.
entitled

Claim

Title

Second
Fourth
Seventh
Thirteenth
Fourteenth
Fifteenth

Trespass
Negligence
Breach of WarrantySatisfaction of Lien
Wrongful Lien
Punitive Damages

By virtue of the claims set forth above, Plaintiffs are
to

a

default

judgment

in

the

total

amount

of

, broken down as follows:
Amount

Claim

Item of damage

$ 7,960.01
170.00
490.00
10,900.00
9,458.00

2, 4, 7
2, 4, 7
2, 4, 7
13
14

Repair of driveway
Repair of rain gutter
Repair of lawn and landscaping
Failure to release lien
Loss of refinance opportunity

$28,978.01

TOTAL
4.

Plaintiffs are further entitled to default judgment for

attorneys fees in the amount of > ~ ~ Q —
5.

.

Plaintiffs are further entitled to punitive damages in

the amount of
6.

.

f)~i OuOt

6d

Pursuant to Rule 54

(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, the Court directs that default judgment be entered
herein constituting

the final judgment on all claims between

Plaintiffs and A,J, Dean herein,
-7-
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DATED this Pb -~d~ay of

LrfX; (LShArfs}],

1996

BY THE COURT:
y

\

Judge Anne M.
Third District Court
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
GREEN & BERRY

R. Scott BerryAttorney for A.J. Dean
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